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HOW DO YOU GET A LAWYER AROUND HERE?
THE AMBIGUOUS INVOCATION OF A
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER
MIRANDA V.ARIZONA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."' In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona,2 the
United States Supreme Court established procedural safeguards to
protect an accused's Fifth Amendment
rights from the coercive effects
3
of custodial interrogations.

1. The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an analysis that sets forth the differences between the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments' rights to counsel, see Jackie Ulrich, CriminalProcedure:The CourtDistinguishes Between the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and the Fifth Amendment Miranda Right Against Self-Incrimination [McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991)], 31
WASHBURN L.J. 629 (1992). See also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda,the police arrested the defendant and placed him
into a special interrogation room where a subsequent confession was obtained. The police,
during this interrogation, failed to give the defendant notice of his right to consult with and
have an attorney present during questioning. Id. at 491.
3. Id. at 444. The Supreme Court's first concern in Miranda was that the atmosphere
created by a police interrogation would coerce the defendant and "subjugate the individual
to the will of the examiner." Id. at 457. The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation
as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
Consequently, a crucial question when confronted with a Miranda problem is whether a
defendant has been placed into custody. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969)
(holding that the defendant was in custody, thus requiring Miranda warnings, when he was
questioned in his bedroom with officers' guns drawn on him and told that he was not free to
leave). Some elements to be considered when determining if an accused is in custody are:
whether the person is considered a suspect or an arrestee, see United States v. Davis, 646 F.2d
1298, 1302 (8th Cir.) (holding that the defendant was not in custody because police had not
arrested the defendant prior to or during a conversation with an informant), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 868 (1981); the period of a suspect's detention, see United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d
1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a suspect is in custody for a period of twenty minutes
in the back of a police car while other members of the criminal operation were being chased
by other members of the police), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981); and constraints placed upon
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Prior to 1994, the Supreme Court had declined to address the issue
of what constituted an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel when an accused is in custody.4 As a result, both state and
federal courts were left to decide that issue as well as the problem of
ambiguous or otherwise unclear statements made by a criminal
defendant. Consequently, three approaches were developed by courts
to tackle this problem. 5 Although the Supreme Court in Davis v. United
States6 stated that an invocation, in order to be valid, must be unambiguous, it failed to officially mandate a procedure to determine what
constituted an "unambiguous invocation."'7 Thus, the courts (and law
enforcement officials) are still faced with this problem.
This Comment will trace the evolution of the right to counsel under
Miranda and examine the three different approaches taken by the lower
courts to address the ambiguity problem. This Comment will also
analyze the Court's decision in Davis, its ramifications upon this Fifth
Amendment issue, the problems still facing the lower courts, and the
effects upon defendants in a custodial interview. Finally, this Comment
will analyze the effect of a defendant's culture on his or her ability to
invoke the right to counsel.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT

A. GeneralBackground
Under Miranda,law enforcement officials must inform a suspect prior
to the initiation of questioning that: (1) he has the right to remain silent;
(2) any statements made by the defendant may be used against him at
trial; (3) he has the right to have an attorney present during questioning;
and (4) an attorney will be provided if he cannot afford one.8 The
the suspect during or prior to questioning, see United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a determining factor in deciding custody issue is whether the suspect
was handcuffed).
4. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 n.4 (1984).
5. See People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (1980) (utilizing the threshold of clarity
standard), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981); United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1985) (utilizing the per se standard), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); and Towne v. Dugger,
899 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir.) (utilizing the clarification standard), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991
(1990).
6. 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994).
7. 1& at 2356-57.
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 478-70 (1966). The Miranda Court stated:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
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ruling in Miranda does not require law enforcement officials to utilize
the exact warnings set forth in Miranda,but requires that the procedures
are "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."9
Consequently, the language used by police merely has to convey the
fundamental message of the Miranda warnings to be effective.' 0
An accused's right to counsel furthers three objectives: (1) it protects
the accused from unwittingly incriminating himself;11 (2) it affords
assistance to the accused when dealing with the convoluted criminal
process; 2 and (3) it allows the accused protection from any compelled
or otherwise involuntary confessions. 3 The right of an accused to
counsel is fundamental and absolute. 4 Consequently, courts must
exclude any confession or statement, given by an accused during a
custodial investigation, that violates Miranda, unless the accused has
been advised of his right to have counsel present and has voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived this right. 5
However, the Mirandawarnings are not constitutionally mandated. 6
Thus, a violation of Miranda is not necessarily a violation of the Fifth

silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning.
Id at 444-45. For a complete analysis of Miranda,see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1987).
9. Miranda,384 U.S. at 467.
10. Id ("[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution of the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process."). See also
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,203-04 (1989) (warning that "we have no way of giving you
a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court,"
accompanied with other unambiguous language, satisfactorily informed the accused of his right
to counsel before interrogation). For a complete examination of Duckworth v. Eagan, see
David C. Roberts, Duckworth v. Eagan: Changing Miranda's Requirement to a Reasonably
Clear Warning, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 91 (1990).
11. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
12. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-70 (1981).
13. See W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §24.3, at 2-7
(rev. 2d ed. 1982).
14. Miranda,384 U.S. at 472.
15. Id at 479. But see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (recognizing a public
safety exception to the Miranda requirements).
16. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,444 (1974) (Mirandawarnings are "not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected").
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Amendment.17 While in some situations a violation of Miranda will
preclude the prosecution from introducing evidence," in other situations the violation will merely be considered harmless error. 9 Finally,
Miranda dictates that if at any point during the interrogation, the
accused "indicates in any manner... that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking[,] there can be no questioning."'2 Consequently, even if there has been a prior waiver by the accused, the
interrogation must stop if at any point he indicates his desire for
counsel.21

B. Before Miranda: Conflicting and Confusing Standards
Prior to Miranda v. Arizona, " the Supreme Court had decided the
admissibility of a defendant's custodial confession based on its "voluntariness."' Although the Supreme Court never articulated a clear and
predictable definition, the test for "voluntariness" was whether the
confessions had been obtained free of any threats or inducements.'
When using this test, the Court looked to the subjective state of mind of
the defendant and the creditability of the statement given, rather than
the procedures utilized to obtain the statement.2
This test was modified in Brown v. Mississippi.26 The Court's
attention focused on the police conduct used to elicit the confession in

17. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655 n.5 (Supreme Court rejected the argument that a
statement made during a custodial interrogation must be considered to be compelled if
obtained in violation of Miranda).
18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (evidence that is procured in violation of Miranda during
a custodial interrogation is inadmissible at trial if there is not proof that warnings were
properly given and there was a waiver of those rights by the accused).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1298 (8th Cir.) (confession
obtained in violation of Miranda harmless error when there was overwhelming evidence to
support the conviction), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 968 (1991).
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
21. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
24. Id. at 585. The Supreme Court stated that the presumption that the confession was
obtained fairly falls when "the confession appears to have been made either in consequence
of inducements... or because of a threat or promise.., operating upon the fears and hopes
of the accused... depriv[ing] him of that freedom of will or self control essential to make his
confession voluntary... ." Id. See also Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for
the Soul?: A Proposalto Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1831 (1987); James J.
Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 975 (1986).
25. See Ogletree, supra note 24, at 1831.
26. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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order to determine the confession's admissibility and its "voluntariness."27 In Brown, the police whipped and hung the defendants
repeatedly between interrogation sessions to secure their confessions.'
The Court held that the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments forced the Court to decide on an ad hoc basis
whether a confession had been obtained through compulsion, therefore
making it inadmissible.29
Under the due process test in Brown, the primary focus was on the
circumstances under which the defendant had been interrogated. This
limited but did not overrule Hopt v. Utah," which looked to the
defendant's state of mind and credibility of his statement.3 1 Consequently, the result was a test that merged these two components in
deciding the admissibility of a statement. However, this modified
approach was plagued by many of the same problems that had surfaced
under the previous applications of the two tests, such as: (1) a lack of
uniform application of factors to be considered in the decision; (2) a lack
of clear guidelines for the lower courts to follow in deciding the
admissibility of statements; and (3) a lack of clear procedural standards
for police interrogations. 32 Because of the lack of any clear uniform
standards, unconstitutional police interrogation procedures continued to
be used to obtain confessions that were later deemed admissible despite
the violations.33
The analysis subsequently changed as a result of two later cases that
addressed the problem of constitutionally challenged confessions. In
Massiah v. United States,34 and Escobedo v. Illinois,5 the Court's
previous due process analysis was rejected, and another based on the

27. Id.at 286.
28. Id. at 281-83. See also Anne E. Link, Fifth Amendment-The Constitutionality of
Custodial Confessions, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 878, 879 (1992).
29. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. The Brown Court stated that:

The due process clause requires that state action ...be consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions. It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to

the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners,
and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence
was a clear denial of due process.
lda
(citations omitted).
30. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
31. See supra note 24.
32. Link, supra note 28, at 880; Ogletree, supra note 24, at 1833-34.
33. Link, supra note 28, at 879-80.
34. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
35. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel was substituted. The Supreme Court
held in Massiah that "surreptitious interrogations" were included within
the activities prohibited by the Sixth Amendment, 6 because a defendant who does not know that he is under
interrogation by a government
37
agent is "'seriously imposed upon.'
In Escobedo, the Court announced that the use of a preindictment
statement, secured by law enforcement officials after they falsely
informed an accused that his lawyer did not wish to see him, was a
violation of the Sixth Amendment." The Escobedo Court stated that
the right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment attaches when the
focus of the interrogation shifts from "investigatory to accusatory," and
when the interview is used as a vehicle to secure a confession.39

However, this switch of analytical schemes did not cure the problem
concerning the unclear standards applied in confession cases. Both state
and federal courts struggled to apply this nebulous "focus" standard and
came up with conflicting results.'
C. The Miranda Decision
In Miranda v. Arizona,41 the Supreme Court addressed the problem
outlined above, and attempted to both settle the law concerning the

36. The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See
also Matthew D. Bowman, The Right to Counsel During CustodialInterrogation:Equivocal
References to an Attorney-Determining What Statements or Conduct Should Constitute an
Accused's Invocation of the Right to Counsel, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1159, 1164-65 (1986).
37. 377 U.S. at 206 (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62,72-73 (2nd Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Hays, J., dissenting)). After his arraignment and subsequent
release, Massiah had an incriminating conversation, which was secretly taped by the police and
later attempted to be admitted at trial, with a codefendant. Id. at 202-03.
38. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 480-83.
39. Id. at 492. The Supreme Court stated:
[W]here ...the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the
Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment ....
Id. at 490-91.
40. See Karl P. Warden, Miranda-Some History,Some Observations,andSome Questions,
20 VAND. L. REV.39, 45-46 (1966) (displaying the conflicts between the courts in attempting
to apply the standard announced in Escobedo).
41. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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admissibility of custodial confessions and announce a uniform standard.42 The Court sought to do this by making three major rulings in
the opinion. First, the Supreme Court found that the informal pressures
inherent in custodial interrogations can rise to the level of compulsion
under the Fifth Amendment.43 Second, the Court ruled that any
custodial hearing, no matter how brief, will involve enough inherent
pressure upon an accused to speak that it would constitute compulsion.' Finally, the Miranda Court held that in order to dispel these
inherent compulsions, the police must inform an accused of his rights in
clear and unequivocal terms prior to the initiation of questioning.45 The
Court stated that the defendant must be apprised that: (1) he has the
right to remain silent during questioning;46 (2) anything said by the
defendant can and will be used against him in a court of law;47 (3) he
has the right to have counsel present during questioning;48 and (4) an
attorney will be provided to the accused if he cannot afford one.49
The Miranda Court also reiterated that there was a heavy burden
placed upon the government to prove that the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incriminaA waiver cannot be presumed by a
tion and right to counsel."
defendant's silence, and the courts will not recognize it as such when
evaluating the admissibility of a subsequent confession.' Finally, the
Supreme Court stated that should the accused invoke either his right to
counsel or his right to remain silent, all questioning of the defendant
must cease. 2
42. Id. at 467.
43. Id. The Supreme Court stated: "[T]he process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not
otherwise do so ... ." Id.
44. I&
45. Id46. IM.at 468. Chief Justice Warren opined that "such a warning is an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." I&.
47. I& at 469. This warning was needed to make an accused aware of the consequences
should he forego this right to silence. Id.
48. Id. at 469-70 ("our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between
silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process").
49. Id. at 473. The Court stated that without this additional warning, indigent defendants
would believe that the right to counsel would only be applicable to those who could afford
one, thus negating the purpose of warning the defendant of his right to have counsel present.
Id.
50. Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)).
51. Id. at 475.
52. Id at 444-45.
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D. Modifications and Interpretationsof Miranda
The Supreme Court has held that if a defendant waives his right to
counsel under the Fifth Amendment after being apprised of his Miranda
rights, the police are free to question him.53 However, "a valid waiver
of that right cannot be established by showing only that [the defendant]
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he
has been advised of his rights.,1 4 Furthermore, once an accused has
invoked his right to counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation by
law enforcement officials regarding any offense until counsel had been
made available to him, unless the defendant initiates any further
interaction or communication by himself.5
This second level of
protection regarding the right to counsel is to prevent the police from
harassing a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda
rights. 6 The remedy for a violation of Miranda is firmly established-any statement given in violation of the rules announced by these cases
cannot be introduced into evidence in the State's case-in-chie 57
However, the statement may be used for the purposes of impeachment. 58
When a court is faced with the problem of determining the admissibility of a statement, it must look to whether the accused actually
invoked his right to counsel and whether the defendant initiated further
discussions after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. In Smith
v. Illinois, 9 the Court expressly refused to answer the question of what
was a valid and binding invocation of the right to counsel.' Consequently, this question was left to the courts below and differing standards
emerged. Thus, the constitutionality (and therefore admissibility) of an
accused's statement depends upon the jurisdiction in which it was given.

53. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,372-76 (1979); see also Minnick v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 146 (1990) (holding that the police cannot inquire regarding any offense unless
counsel is present after an invocation of the right to counsel). For a complete discussion of
Minnick v. Mississippi, see Link, supra note 28, at 878.
54. Butler, 441 U.S. at 376.
55. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
56. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
57. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 479; cf.New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
58. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
59. 469 U.S. 91 (1994).
60. Id. at 95.
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III.

THE STANDARDS USED TO DETERMINE AN INVOCATION OF
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL PRIOR TO UNITED STATES V. DAVIS

A. The Threshold of Clarity Standard
When faced with the difficult problem of an accused's ambiguous
reference to an attorney, some courts have held that the statement must
reach a certain threshold of clarity for it to be effective.6 ' Under this
analysis, the statement made by an accused must be a clear and
unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel in order to trigger the
protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment.62 This type of analysis
was first announced by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Krueger.6' In Krueger, while the defendant was being questioned by the
police in relation to a stabbing death, he stated, "Wait a minute. Maybe
I ought to have an attorney. You guys are trying to pin a murder rap on
me, give me 20 to 40 years."' The officers conducting the interrogation
did not consider this to be a request for counsel and continued to
question Krueger further.65 A short time later, the defendant confessed
to stabbing the victim. At trial, Krueger moved to have his statements
and confession suppressed on the grounds that the police had obtained
them after he had invoked his right to counsel, thus violating the rules
announced in Miranda and Edwards.66 The trial court denied Krueger's
suppression motion and the defendant was convicted at trial.67
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the defendant's conviction and
61. See, eg., State v. Prince, 772 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Ariz. 1989); State v. Moorman, 744
P.2d 679, 685-86 (Ariz. 1987); People v. Evans, 530 N.E.2d 1360, 1369-71 (Ill.
1988), cert
denied, 490 U.S. 1113 (1989); People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540-41 (Ill.
1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981); Bane v. State, 587 N.E.2d 97, 102-04 (Ind. 1992); State v. Lamp,
332 N.W.2d 48,56 (Iowa 1982); State v. Campbell, 367 N.W.2d 454,458-59 (Minn. 1985); State
v. Moore, 744 S.W.2d 479, 480-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Lattanzio, 549 N.Y.2d 179,
181 (App. Div. 1989); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385,395-96 (Va. 1990), cert denied,
502 U.S. 824 (1991).
62. Bane v. State, 587 N.E.2d at 103.
63. 412 N.E.2d 537 (ill. 1980). The police began the interview by questioning the
defendant about several other unrelated burglaries. The defendant, in response to the police
questions, stated that he was involved with the robberies, but not in the stabbing. ld.
64. Id. at 538. There were discrepancies at trial as to exactly what the defendant said
at this point. One officer stated that the defendant jumped "out of his chair and said, 'Hey
you're trying to pin a murder on me. Maybe I need a lawyer."' Id. Another officer testified
that the defendant said, "'Just a minute. That's a 20 to 40 years sentence. Maybe I ought to
talk to an attorney. You're trying to pin a murder rap on me."' Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 539.
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ruled that Krueger's Miranda rights had not been violated.' In its
opinion, the Krueger court stated that although it was cognizant of the
"in any manner" language used in Miranda,it did not believe Miranda
demanded that any reference to an attorney be accorded the legal
significance of an invocation of the right to counsel.6 9 Consequently, in
order to trigger the protections afforded by Miranda, a reference to an
attorney must meet a certain threshold of clarity to give it legal effect. 70
The Krueger court held that the defendant's remarks did not reach the
threshold of clarity necessary to invoke his right to counsel. 71 The
Krueger court also stated that other elements should be considered when
deciding the meaning of the defendant's statements. These elements
included the defendant's intelligence, comprehension of his Miranda
rights, and a valid waiver of those rights prior to the initiation of
questioning. 72 Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that it did not
give credit to the defendant's position that he believed at the time that
any further requests for counsel would have been futile.73
Under this standard, a defendant who is intimidated by the interrogation room atmosphere may not voice his desire to obtain counsel in a
way that will be legally recognizable. The defendant, although earnestly
desiring counsel, is unlikely to know that he must assert his right in this

68. Id. at 540.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Il
73. Id. at 539. The defendant's cross examination at trial in pertinent part is as follows:
Q: Why did you continue talking to them [the police] after you say you said, "I think
I should have an attorney?"
A: Have you ever been questioned by three Rockford Police Detectives?
Q: No, I haven't, but I want to know why you continued talking to them.
A: Because I believed that it was self-defense. I still do. They wanted a statement
of what happened to clear it up. I wanted to get if off my chest, so I gave them a
statement.
Q: But you know you had a right to have an attorney there if you wanted one, didn't
you?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: You ever insist on having an attorney contacted?
A: I asked for an attorney before I began the statement, and I saw that it was not
going to get me anywhere, so I just ceased on that line, because I just knew I wasn't
going to get an attorney anyways.
Q: Did it occur to you not to talk any further?
A: Yes, but it occurred to me I might be up all night and be badgered by these three
detectives.
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fashion in order for it to be effective. Consequently, defendants may
view any subsequent questioning by interviewing agents as a denial of
their request or operate under the belief that they are not entitled to
counsel at the present questioning, regardless of what they have been
told. Thus, it seems that this standard is contrary to the spirit of
Mirandaand further limits a defendant's right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment.
B. The Per Se Standard
A second approach used by the courts to address the problem of an
ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel is the per se standard.74
Of the three standards, the per se standard is the most defendantoriented approach. Under this analysis, even the most ambiguous or
equivocal request for an attorney is treated as an invocation of the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel, demanding the cessation of any further
police questioning. Courts, utilizing this standard, apply a per se bar to
any further questioning after an ambiguous reference to the right to
counsel is made by an accused.
The Sixth Circuit formulated this standard in Maglio v. Jago.75 In
Maglio, the defendant was a 16-year-old suspect in a murder case.76
After police read him his Mirandarights, Maglio stated, "Maybe I should
have an attorney."" In response, the interrogating officer stated that

74. In addition to the cases mentioned infra, many other courts have utilized this
approach. See, e.g., Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978); People v. Hinds, 201
Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (Ct. App. 1984); People v. Traubert, 608 P.2d 342, 346 (Colo. 1980) (en
bane); State v. Elmore, 500 A.2d 1089, 1092 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Hunt v. State,
632 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
75. 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
76. 11 at 203.
77. Id.The full exchange between the two parties is as follows:
Q: All right, do you further understand that before you, you would talk with us that
you could have a lawyer here present with you, do you understand that?
A: Yea, but I have to get a lawyer when I go to court. I can't afford it.
Q: Well, let's go back up here. Let me ask you this question again. Do you
understand that before you would talk to me or talk to the officers that you have a
right to have a lawyer present with you before you talk to us. Do you understand
that you have that constitutional right?
A: Yea, I know I got it.
Q: Do you understand that?
A: Yea.
Q: Okay, the next question is this. Do you further understand that if you want a
lawyer but didn't feel that you could afford one, that we would have to appoint one
for you before you talked to us. Do you understand that?
A: Before I did talk to you?
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he was unable to have an attorney appointed for Maglio until the
following day in court.78 The officer further informed him, however,
that he was not required to respond to any more questioning without his
lawyer present. 79 Despite the officer's warning, Maglio later admitted
to the murder in a taped confession.8"
The court of appeals rejected the argument that Mirandarequires a
defendant to expressly and unequivocally assert his right to an attorney
before that right is triggered, and held that Maglio's Fifth Amendment
rights had been violated. The court reached this conclusion by looking
to the language used in Miranda that stated "in any manner""1 in
referring to a defendant's invocation. Additionally, the court looked to
the language utilized in the Supreme Court decision in Michigan v.
Mosley' that "strongly suggest[s] a per se rule barring custodial
83
interrogation of a suspect after a request for counsel has been made."
The Maglio court held that when there is a request for counsel, all
interrogations by the law officials must cease immediately if the
defendant, at any stage, "indicates in any manner... that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking."'84 The court then concluded
that the defendant's constitutional rights had been violated when the
officer continued questioning Maglio after he made an ambiguous
statement regarding an attorney. The court further found that the
subsequent questioning by the police officer was an attempt to have

Q: Yea, do you understand that-duly appointed for you?
A: I understand it now. It's not the way it seemed before, but it doesn't matter.
Q: Well, do you understand that right?
A: Yea.
Q: Now, do you understand that if you would decide to talk with us that you could
stop talking at any time that you want to, that you can just cease and be quiet?
That's your constitutional right. Do you understand that?
A: Yes, sir.
Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 8. The court also specifically relied on the following part of Miranda:
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to
confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.
If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before
speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
82. 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975).
83. Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205.
84. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445).
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Maglio recant his earlier request for counsel in order to obtain a
confession. As a result, the confession was suppressed. 5
In addition to federal circuits, many states have adopted this
approach to requests for counsel.8 6 In Ochoa v. State,87 the defendant
was convicted for capital murder as a result oft inter alia, a confession
that he made to officers after the shooting of a police officer.88
According to the testimony at trial, the defendant was arrested at the
scene of the shooting and immediately given his Miranda rights. He was
then taken to the jailhouse, brought before a justice of the peace, and
reread his Miranda rights.89 When asked if he understood his rights,
the defendant answered affirmatively. During the following four hours,
the defendant was questioned about the shooting and eventually
confessed. At trial, the primary issue was whether the confession had
been obtained after the defendant had invoked his right to counsel.'
Under questioning by defense counsel, the interrogating officer stated:
He [the defendant] said that he probably ought to talk to a
lawyer or something to this effect or didn't want to sign anything
until he talked to a lawyer, if I recall correctly. He then said
something to the effect, "Well, I will talk to you, but I don't want
to sign anything."91
The Supreme Court of Texas, sitting en bane, ruled that the
defendant had in fact invoked his right to counsel, and that the officers
had violated this right by not stopping the interrogation in order to
secure counsel for the defendant.92 The Ochoa court, like the court in
Maglio, relied upon the "in any manner" language used in Miranda, in
addition to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v.

85. Id. The Maglio court further stated:
In any case, Captain Traub [the interrogating police officer] clearly interpreted the
comment as a request for an attorney, since he immediately said the questioning
would have to stop, and qualified his earlier offer of counsel by telling Maglio he
would have to wait until the next day to have a lawyer appointed for him.
Unfortunately, the Captain did not honor his own recognition of the law but
continued to probe until he obtained a confession. The only plausible object of
Traub's continued questioning was to break down the suspect's attempt to assert his
rights and elicit a confession.
IL
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See supra note 73.
573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
Id. at 798-99.
Id.
Id. at 799.
1d.

92. Id-at 800-01.
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Mosley, to support its conclusion of a per se rule.93 The court stated
that "[w]e read this language in Miranda literally; where a defendant
indicates in any way that94 he desires to invoke his right to counsel,
interrogation must cease.,
Thus, the per se standard used by courts to evaluate an ambiguous
statement regarding counsel is the polar opposite of the threshold of
clarity standard. Where the threshold of clarity standard only gives legal
effect to direct and clear invocations of a defendant's right to counsel,
the per se standard indicates that any statement, whether ambiguous or
not, is a valid invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.'
Moreover, where the threshold of clarity standard infringes upon a
defendant's right to counsel, the per se standard unduly burdens law
enforcement officials by precluding them from further questioning when
a defendant ambiguously refers to an attorney but does not have a
present desire to invoke that right. Consequently, these two standards
represent both ends of the spectrum of court decisions attacking this
problem.

C. The ClarificationStandard
The third standard used to evaluate a defendant's unclear statement
regarding counsel is the clarification standard.96 This examination
represents the middle ground between the per se and threshold of clarity
standards. Under this analysis, if a defendant makes an ambiguous
reference to counsel, the interrogating official must limit any further
questions to those that are designed to clarify whether the defendant has
in fact voiced a present desire to have counsel during questioning.9 7
93. Id. See also supra note 80; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100 (1975).
94. Ochoa, 573 S.W.2d at 800.
95. Id.; see also Maglio, 580 F.2d at 207.
96. See, e.g., Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir.), cert.denied, 498 U.S. 991
(1990); United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fouche, 833
F.2d 1284, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); United States v. Porter,
776 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1985); Thompson v. Wainright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1979); Nash
v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979); Giacomazzi v. State,
633 P.2d 1173, 1180 (Alaska 1981); State v. Statz, 768 P.2d 143, 146 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc);
People v. Hulsing, 825 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Anderson, 553 A.2d 589,
593-95 (Conn. 1989); Crawford v. State, 580 A.2d 571, 576-77 (Del. 1990); Martinez v. State,
564 So. 2d 1071-73 (Fla. 1990); Hall v. State, 336 S.E.2d 812, 818 (Ga. 1985); State v. Pilcher,
472 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Minn. 1991); Sechrest v. State, 705 P.2d 626, 630 (Nev. 1985); State v.
Robtoy, 653 P.2d 284, 290 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 619-21
(Wyo. 1982).
97. United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988). For a complete discussion
of United States v. Gotay, see Ada Clapp, The Second CircuitAdopts a ClarificationApproach
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This approach is in direct contradiction to the per se rule, which
mandates that all questioning must cease after such a reference, and
modifies the threshold of clarity standard, which does not limit at all the
subsequent questioning of a defendant if the request for counsel is not
direct and clear.9"
The Fifth Circuit announced this standard in Nash v. Estelle.9 In
Nash, the defendant had been convicted of killing a taxi cab driver based
on a taped confession obtained during an interview with the district
attorney prosecuting the case.' The taped confession was the primary
issue of the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, which was granted by the
district court and subsequently reversed by a three judge panel of the
Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit, en banc, upheld the panel's ruling
reversing the grant of habeas corpus relief."'
Nash was first arrested by the police pursuant to a warrant issued on
the basis of a witness who had placed the accused in the cab of the
murdered driver. 2 Nash was then taken before a magistrate who
advised him of his Miranda rights. After being held for two days, the
defendant was interviewed by the district attorney in charge of the case.
Prior to the initiation of the interview, the district attorney again advised
Nash of his rights, but upon reaching the portion regarding the
appointment of counsel, Nash stated, "Well, I don't have the money to
hire one, but I would like, you know, to have one appointed." The
district attorney responded, "You want one to be appointed for you?"
and Nash replied, "[y]es, sir.'"" Following this exchange, the governto Ambiguous Requests for CounseL" United States v. Gotay, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 511 (1990).

98. See supra note 60.
99. 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1979).
100. Id at 515.
101. Id.

102. 1&
103. ld.
at 517. A more complete record of the conversation (Files being the name of
the district attorney) is as follows:
F: Please just tell us about it. Any time we are talking and you decide that you need
somebody else here, you just tell me about it and we will get somebody up here.
N: Well, I don't have the money to hire one [an attorney], but I would like, you
know, to have one appointed.
F: You want one to be appointed for you?
N: Yes sir.
F: Okay. I had hoped we could talk about this, but if you want a lawyer appointed,
then we are going to have to stop right now.
N: But, uh, I kinda, you know, wanted, you know, to talk about it, you know, to
kinda, you know, try to get it straightened out.
F: Well, I can talk about it with you and I would like to, but if you want a lawyer,
well, I am going to have to hold off, I can't talk to you. It's your life.
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ment lawyer stated that he must cease all further discussion regarding the
murder if the defendant wanted to have a lawyer present.' °4 Nash
responded that although he wanted to have an attorney appointed for
05
him, he would prefer to discuss the murder with the district attorney.
The prosecutor then questioned Nash if he was certain that this was what
he desired to do. Nash responded affirmatively, and the prosecutor then
had Nash sign a written waiver of his Miranda rights. 6 During the
course of the subsequent interview, Nash confessed to the murder of the
cab driver.'0 7
The Fifth Circuit held that Nash's invocation was equivocal as he
expressed both a desire to have counsel appointed and a desire to speak
with the district attorney."° The court further ruled that Nash's
confession was admissible because it was revealed by the taped
conversation that he did not intend to presently invoke his right to
counsel during the interview, but wanted to be reassured that counsel
would be appointed for him in the future."° In its ruling, the Fifth
Circuit relied on the Miranda decision, which supposedly addressed this
particular problem." 0 The Nash court further opined that it is sound
constitutional practice to clarify a defendant's request when faced with

N: I would like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you.
F: Well, what that [a waiver form of Nash's Miranda rights] says there is, it doesn't
say that you don't ever want to have a lawyer, it says that you don't want to have a
lawyer here, now. You got the right now, and I want you to know that. But if you
want to have a lawyer here, well, I am not going to talk to you about it.
N: No, I would rather talk to you.
F: You would rather talk to me? You do not want to have a lawyer here right now?
N: No, sir.
F: You are absolutely certain of that?
N: Yes, sir.
F: Go ahead and sign that thing [the waiver form].
Id. at 516-17 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 516.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 517.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 518.
109. Id. Four judges on the panel hearing the case upheld the clarification standard
employed by the majority, but dissented upon its application to these facts. The dissenters
stated that Nash had invoked his right to counsel prior to the confession and therefore found
that the confession should have been excluded. Id. at 520-534.
110. Id. at 517. "If [a suspect] is indecisive in his request for counsel, there may be some
question on whether he did or did not waive counsel. Situations of this kind must necessarily
be left to the judgment of the interviewing Agent." Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 485 (1966)).
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The Fifth Circuit
an ambiguous statement regarding counsel."'
not be used "as a
could
warned, however, that this clarification process
2
subterfuge for coercion or intimidation.""1
The majority of the federal circuits and state supreme courts have
adopted this approach to the ambiguity problem.13 These courts have
faced statements such as: "Why don't I have an attorney here now?,""
"Shouldn't I have an attorney so you don't ask me any illegal questions?,""' and "When will I be able to go to court on this here and
talk to a lawyer or something?""' 6 Officers faced with these dilemmas
should be afforded the opportunity to question the accused to see if he
in fact does presently desire to have counsel present. The clarification
standard minimizes the risk that a statement or confession obtained after
an ambiguous statement regarding counsel will later be deemed
inadmissible. Furthermore, the clarification approach also benefits an
accused. It provides the defendant the opportunity to respond to a
question directly aimed at her intention to invoke her Fifth Amendment
rights. As such, an intimidated defendant may more readily recognize
her right to counsel when it is addressed directly, and affords her a direct
opportunity to invoke that right. Thus, it seems that this standard works
to the benefit of both parties in a custodial interrogation and represents
a workable solution to a fundamental problem.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO AMBIGUOUS STATEMENTS: THE DAVIS DECISION

A.

The Facts of Davis v. United States

The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of an
ambiguous reference to counsel in the case of Davis v. United States."7
In Davis, the defendant was a member of the United States Navy
stationed at Charleston Naval Base."' On the night of October 2,
1988, Davis and another sailor, Keith Shackleford, were involved in a

111.
112.
113.
114.
(1989).
115.
116.
117.
118.

ld.
Id. at 517-18.
See supra note 95.
Howard v. Pung, 862 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920
State v. Doughty, 472 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1991).
Kuykendall v. State, 585 So. 2d 773, 775 (Miss. 1991).
114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
Iai
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dispute over a pool bet at a club on the base.' 9 The next morning
Shackleford's body was discovered severely beaten on a loading dock
behind the club. 20 An investigation into Shackleford's murder was
instituted by the Naval Investigative Service ("NIS") and the defendant
became a prime suspect in the case.'
On November 4, 1988, Davis was interviewed by several NIS agents
regarding the Shackleford incident." Prior to questioning, the NIS
agents told Davis that he was a suspect in the case, that he was not
required to give a statement, that anything that he said could be used in
a subsequent court-martial proceeding, and that he had the right to have
counsel present during the questioning." Davis then waived his rights
both orally and in writing. 24 A short time into the interview with the
agents, Davis stated, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.""' The NIS
agents asked whether Davis wanted a lawyer, or if he was just making
a comment about a lawyer." 6 Davis replied that he was not asking for
a lawyer and he didn't want one.'2 After the questioning continued
for another hour, the defendant said, "I think I want a lawyer before I
say anything else.""' At that time, the NIS agents stopped questioning
the defendant. 2 9
At the court-martial, the defendant moved to suppress his statements
made to the NIS agents during the November interview.30 The motion
was denied and the defendant was convicted of unpremeditated murder
and sentenced to confinement for life."' The United States Court of
119. Id.
120. AL
121. 1d
122. Id at 2351.
123. Id.
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id
127. Id. One of the interviewing NIS agents stated:
[W]e made it very clear that we're not here to violate his rights, that if he wants a
lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that we weren't going to
pursue the matter unless we have it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just
making a comment about a lawyer, and he said, "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer,"
and then he continued on, and said, "No, I don't want a lawyer."
Id
128. Id
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. The military judge ruled that "the mention of a lawyer by [Davis] during the
course of the interrogation [was] not in the form of a request for counsel and ... the agents
properly determined that [Davis] was not indicating a desire for or invoking his right to coun-
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Military Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment," and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Davis' initial
statement constituted an actual invocation of his right to counsel.133
B. The Court's Ruling
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, first restated the inherent
differences that exist between a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda."M
The Supreme Court traced the history and holdings of Miranda and its
progeny, and reiterated that the "invocation of the Miranda right to
counsel 'requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be
construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an
attorney.""' 35 The Court then stated that the jurisprudence under
Miranda did not require the cessation of all questioning when an
ambiguous reference to an attorney is made.'36 Rather, Justice O'Connor opined, a defendant must articulate his desire to have counsel
present with sufficient clarity such that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be an invocation of the
defendant's right to counsel.'37 If that level is not
reached, an inter38
questioning.
cease
to
bound
not
is
officer
viewing
The Supreme Court declined to extend the ruling in Edwards
(precluding any further questioning when an accused has invoked the
right to counsel) to apply to ambiguous statements, stating that such an
sel." Ld.
132. Id. The Court of Military Appeals stated in its opinion:
Some jurisdictions have held that any mention of counsel, however ambiguous, is
sufficient to require that all questioning cease. Others have attempted to define a
threshold standard of clarity for invoking the right to counsel and have held that
comments falling short of the threshold do not invoke the right to counsel. Some
jurisdictions... have held that all interrogation about the offense must immediately
cease whenever a suspect mentions counsel, but they allow interrogators to ask
narrow questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the [suspect's] desires
respecting counsel.
Id. at 2353 (citing Davis v. United States, 36 M.J 337, 341 (1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2350

(1994)).
133.

Id. at 2352.

134. Id. at 2354. While the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at the
initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, a suspect subject to custodial interrogation has
the right to consult with an attorney and to have counsel present during questioning, and the
police must explain this right to him before questioning begins. Id.
135. Id. at 2355. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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extension "'would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly
irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity."'139
Justice O'Connor also stated that such an extension would muddle the
bright line rule established in Edwards that questioning must cease if an
accused requests an attorney. However, the Davis court recognized that
it would be good practice for interviewing agents to clarify a defendant's
statement if it seems to be an ambiguous reference to an attorney."4
Consequently, it seems that the Supreme Court has adopted the
threshold of clarity standard to apply to vague references to an attorney,
while also recommending that interrogating law officials adopt the
clarification approach in order to insure the constitutionality
of any
141
reference.
ambiguous
defendant's
that
after
made
statements
V. EFFECTS OF THE DAVIS DECISION AND THE ASSERTION OF A
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Under the ruling announced in Davis, it is evident that a request for
an attorney, in order to be legally valid, must be clear and unequivocal.
However, what constitutes a request according to one person may not be
considered as such by another. The Supreme Court recognized this
danger when it stated, "We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of
the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who-because of
fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons-will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they
actually want to have a lawyer present."'
The "variety of other
reasons" that the court alludes to may have a much stronger inhibition
upon a defendant's assertion than those named. TWo such reasons that
have been addressed by legal commentators are gender and race.4 A
third possible reason much akin to race is the defendant's cultural
background. Thus, the method and location of a person's upbringing
139. Id at 2355-56 (citation omitted).
140. Id at 2356.
141. I at 2356-57.
142. Id. at 2356.
143. Two other groups that manifest an indirect mode of speaking, thus affecting their
assertion of a right to counsel, are women and African-Americans. See Janet E. Ainsworth,
In a Different Register: The Pragmaticsof Powerlessnessin Police Interrogation,103 YALE L.J.
259 (1993) (advocating the adoption of the per se rule); Thurmon Garner, Cooperative
CommunicationStrategies: Observationsin a Black Community, 14 J. BLACK STUD. 233 (1983).
For a complete discussion of speech communication and the differences between the sexes in
the workplace, see DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5: How WOMEN'S AND MEN'S
CONVERSATIONAL STYLES AFFECT WHO GETS HEARD, WHO GETS CREDIT, AND WHAT

GETS DONE AT WORK (1994).
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may have a profound effect upon their invocation of the right to counsel.
Of the many societies that differ from the Anglo-European structure,
Asian societies display the greatest conflict with the assumptions
regarding the assertion of individual rights.'" While individuality, and
assertion of that individuality, is stressed and looked upon with favor in
American society, the reverse is true in Asian society. Members of an
Asian community, whether in the country of origin of that culture or
within American society, are taught to respect and favor the good of the
group over the good of the individual.'45 This aspect translates into a
greater deference to authority and a greater propensity to maintain
silence when faced with a problem."4 As one Japanese linguist
observed:
Each American individual has rights, expresses these rights, and
expects others to listen to such requests. When a right is abused,
it is equally as important for the abused to "stand up for his or
her rights," as it is for others to try to correct the unjustified
situation. Thus rights are a critical criteria for individuality....
For Japanese, the proverb, "the nail that sticks out gets hammered back in" reflects how [a person] should not stand out. In
fact, translating the compliment in English, "She's a real individual!" to Japanese becomes an insult: "What a person with strong
individuaity!1"'47
Consequently, a member of an Asian society would be much less likely
to assert his rights in the face of authority. To do so would be in
contravention of a societal standard that is firmly ingrained within the
Asian culture.
Another aspect of the cultural differences that affects a person's
assertiveness in requesting counsel is the mode of speech used. While
Americans are noted for their direct manner of speech and consider
directness logical and aligned with power, many cultures utilize varieties
of indirectness as the norm in communication."4 The use of an
indirect method of speech is preferred in Asian society and is considered
sophisticated. 149 Furthermore, a greater value is placed on silence than

144. HARU YAMADA,

AMERICAN

AND

JAPANESE

BUSINESS

DISCOURSE:

A

COMPARISON OF INTERACnIONAL STYLES 28 (1992).

145. Id. at 29-33.
146. See Sondra Thiederman, Communication: Overcoming Cultural and Language
Barriers,PERSONNEL J. Dec. 1988, BB R16.3 at 34-40.
147. YAMADA, supra note 143, at 29-30.
148. TANNEN, supra note 142, at 85.
149. ia at 96.
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speech in Asian societies, and ideas are believed best communicated
without being explicitly stated.15° Transferring this idea into a context
similar to Davis, it is easy to see how this cultural pressure and indirect
method of speech would inhibit a direct and unequivocal invocation of
the right to counsel.
A final aspect that must be taken into account in this context is the
Nowhere else in the
importance of authority in the Asian culture.'
world is authority, whether familial or societal, more respected and
promoted than in the Asian cultures.'52 One sociologist stated, "Although Asians have traditionally tended to crave stronger authority...
[t]he West has ... an enthusiasm for checking authority."'53

As a

result, this respect for authority would compel an Asian-American
defendant to answer questions posed by police to a greater degree than
a non-Asian-American defendant. Therefore, although an AsianAmerican may not directly assert his Fifth Amendment right to counsel
because of societal influences, he will nevertheless answer questions from
an authoritative figure because of those same influences.
Aggregating the three societal elements discussed above and
examining the possible effects that they would place on a defendant, it
is clear that the clarification approach to an ambiguous statement is the
best solution to this problem. It alleviates the problems that arise under
the threshold of clarity standard, while not overburdening police officers
in their pursuit of effective law enforcement. Consequently, it is the
compromise best suited to address the problem of an ambiguous
statement made in reference to an attorney during a custodial interrogation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For many years, the lower courts have struggled to formulate a
process to evaluate a defendant's ambiguous reference to an attorney
during a custodial interrogation. The split among the lower courts
represents the three different possible interpretations of the language
and intent of Miranda. However, it must not be forgotten that the
Miranda decision was in response to the many abuses of defendants'
rights perpetrated by overzealous law enforcement officials. Chief

150. Id.
151. LUCIEN W. PYE, ASIAN POWER AND POLITICS: THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
AUTHORITY 31-54 (1985).

152. Id. at 38.
153. Id.
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Justice Earl Warren stated that the Miranda decision represented a
critical balance between an accused's rights secured by the Constitution
and the societal interest in effective law enforcement. 154 It seems that
this critical balance has been overlooked.
This Comment has illustrated how the current law regarding the
invocation of the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment has failed
to recognize the inherent problems associated with a multi-cultural
society. Of the three standards considered, it is evident that the
clarification standard is the only process that adequately recognizes the
cultural diversity of the American society while allowing effective law
enforcement. It permits further inquiry of a defendant who, for
whatever reason, has not directly invoked his right to counsel, while not
overburdening police officials in the execution of their duties. Thus, it
represents the modem day application, message, and spirit of Miranda.
ADAM GEOFFREY FINGER

154. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).

